The Terms of Trade of Food Producers as a Mechanism of Rural Differentiation by Gore, Charles
The Terms of Trade of Food Producers as a
Mechanism of Rural Differentiation
Charles Gore
Discussion of the agricultural terms of trade
usually focuses on year-to-year trends to see
whether there has been an increase or decrease
in the general level of producer prices (or the
prices of particular agricultural commodities)
relative to the prices of the goods and services
which farmers purchase. Analyses within poor
countries have been directed towards determining
whether there has been a transfer of resources
from rural areas to towns (Young 1971; Maimbo
and Fry, 1971; Fry 1975; and Lipton 1977), from
agricultural to non-agricultural sectors (Mellor
1973), or from poor rural producers to rich urban
consumers (Elliott 1975). This paper examines how
the terms of trade of food producers can act as a
mechanism perpetuating and intensifying eco-
nomic inequality both within and between rural
communities.
A process of rural differentiation can occur
because of the commodity structure, the seasonal
structure and the spatial structure of the barter
terms of trade. The first of these factors has
been identified in trend analyses of the terms
of trade which disaggregate producer prices by
commodity, and I do not wish to dwell on it
here. Clearly, if different agricultural com-
modities exhibit different price trends and if
farmers specialise in particular crops or live-
stock, those farmers producing the commodities
whose prices rise fastest (or fall slowest) are
better off than those specialising in other com-
modities. This can act as an important mechan-
ism generating regional income inequalities
because of ecological limits to production (see,
for example, Leff 1972), and if there are
economic and social constraints preventing
farmers from switching amongst commodities,
differences in price trends between commodities
can widen economic disparities between indi-
viduals as well as between areas.
The focus of the present paper is the seasonal
and spatial structure of the terms of trade.
Seasonal and spatial variations in producer
prices and the rural cost of living have been
obscured in trend analyses of average national
prices. The omission of these dimensions is
perhaps not surprising as they compound prob-
lems of data collection which are already
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severe. But the inability to conduct statistical
analyses to specify the precise nature of a
relationship should not prevent the identification
of that relationship. The purpose of the present
paper is to direct attention to variations in the
seasonal and spatial structure of the terms of
trade which are creating systematic economic
disparities within the rural sector, and which
recur in many poor countries. While no attempt
is made to conduct a price index analysis dis-
aggregated by season and location, the argument
is based on field research in southern Ghana,
and some evidence of the scale of seasonal and
spatial price differences in that country is
presented.
Seasonal structure
Seasonal variations in the terms of trade of
food producers arise because of seasonality in
both producer prices and the rural cost of living.
Seasonal movements in producer prices are
inevitable for all commodities which have an
annual rhythm of harvesting but they are par-
ticularly strong in economies where storage
facilities are rudimentary and losses conse-
quently high; where farmers are poor and so
do not have the cash reserves necessary to delay
marketing after harvest; where interest rates
are high and so rich merchants prefer to use
capital providing loans rather than storing
commodities; where high transport costs, a
lack of transport facilities (especially lorries)
and imperfect market information leave farming
localities poorly integrated into the regional
and national market; and where processing
industries, which may preserve perishable com-
modities, are undeveloped. Seasonal fluctuations
tend to be most severe in those regions where
ecological constraints narrow the range of
production possibilities and limit the timing of
harvests to a few months each year.
Taking Ghana as an example, what is the
magnitude of seasonality in producer prices?
Somewhat perversely, we must start the dis-
cussion at the urban end of the market chain
and then work back, for it is only in the large
towns that there are reasonably reliable price
data over a long period of time. Rourke (1971)
has computed seasonal indices' of wholesale
prices for eight staple foodstuffs (the most
important locally-consumed crops in the agricul-
tural economy) in three major urban markets
using time series which mainly extend from
1957 to 1970. He finds that local rice, cocoyam
and garn exhibit the least seasonality, with
monthly indices between 90 (89 for cocoyam
and local rice) and 110: millet and guinea corn
show more marked seasonality, with indices
fluctuating between 80 (79 for millet) and 120;
whilst plantain, yams and maize show the most
marked seasonality, with indices fluctuating
from 70 to 146. from 79 to 130, and from
77 to 136 respectively. One may expect seasonal
fluctuations in producer prices to be at least
as large as these, and probably larger. As Jenes
(1968) has observed on Nigeria, there are two
logical reasons for this: firstly, some traders
store produce; secondly, and, perhaps more
significantly, as the majority of traders do not
undertake seasonal arbitrage, urban centres
receive supplies from several areas with different
harvesting dates and so the impact of local gluts
and shortages is muted.
Fragments of evidence on producer prices
suggest marked seasonality. From my own
field observations in the Forest Belt of south-
eastern Ghana in 1974 and 1975, maize prices
increased by between two and three times from
the months in which the major harvest was
reaped to the pre-harvest months. Cassava and
cocoyam, both harvested throughout the year,
increased by between 50 per cent and 100 per
cent; and plantain, also harvested throughout
the year but with marked seasonality in the
marketed surplus, increased by 400 per cent.
The scale of these movements is particularly
significant as the Forest Belt is the most benign
ecological region for farming in the country,
with two rainy seasons and the production of
a range of substitutable staples with varied
harvesting dates, and so seasonal movements
may be expected to be more dramatic in other
parts of the country. Further north, in the
Middle Belt of the country, Nyariteng and Van
Apeldoorn (1971) observe that in the late 1960s
maximum yam and maize prices in each crop
year were between two and four times greater
than minimum prices, though with limited data
they can discern no pronounced seasonal pat-
tern for shelled groundouts, konkonte and local
rice. In the far northeast of the country, Bauer
1 The index for each month is an average of the ratio of prices
for that month to the appropriate 12-month moving average.
(1954) shows that prices2 of late millet, guinea
corn and groundnuts just before harvest were
between two and eight times as great as levels
ruling immediately after, though his evidence
dates from the 1940s and the pattern may have
improved.
These data are admittedly mere fragments in
a complicated patchwork, but they point to-
wards widespread and surprisingly large seasonal
price movements for many crops, including some
major cash-earners. Let us examine their dis-
tributional implications, assuming for the
moment that seasonality in the rural cost of
living neither counteracts nor reinforces the
resultant swings in the terms of trade.
The distributional impact of fluctuations in
producer prices depends on the magnitude of
seasonal movements, ort the commodity struc-
ture of individual producers' marketed surplus.
and, most critically, on differences in the ability
of producers to sell when prices are high. For
commodities whose supply cannot be controlled,
all farmers are equally affected by price fluctu-
ations. But for commodities which are harvested
seasonally and can be stored, producers without
cash reserves invariably sell at the time of year
when prices are lowest (and terms of trade least
favourable) whilst those with cash reserves in-
variably wait for a good price. Generally, two
types of producer have cash reserves: large-scale
producers, and those with a steady off-farm
income (for example, from trading). Storage costs
may reduce the real value of the seasonal price
increase but in Ghana, at least, traditional
methods of storage often result in negligible
losses over the short period from harvest time to
two or three months after, by which time prices
are sigiiilieantly higher.3 The economic conse-
quence of the seasonal movement in producer
prices is that rich producers, who can afford to
defer sale, year after year receive more for their
output than others, thus intensifying existing
disparities within rural communities.
Trend analyses of the magnitude of seasonal
price movements can reveal a further important
pattern which may be illustrated by maize
prices in southeastern Ghana in the first half of
the 197th. During that period there was rapid
2 The Units of sale sugge.t that his data apply to retail prices
but, as argued above, producer price fluctuations may be
expected to be at ieast as large.
3 1 make this assertion on the basis of my own field observa-
tions, though the scanty pubiished evidence on the aubject
is contradictorysee Nyanteng (1972).
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inflation of producer prices for maize hut at the
sanie ti/rn' ti/ere nos an increase in seasonal flue-
[nations as prices at the time of the major harvest
were increasing much more slowly than prices
in the pre-harvest months. For example, in
Asesewa, the major rural assembly market for
maize in southeastern Ghana, the lowest price
for a bag of maize during the 1970-71 crop year
((July-June) was about N8.00, and in the four
subsequent years it was approximately N9.00,
Nl0.00, Nl 1.00. and Nq'12.00. In contrast, the
highest prices in the corresponding five crop
years were about Nl8.00, N30.00, N30.00,
N23.00 and N38.00. Thus trend analyses of
\ear-to-year changes in terms of trade of food
producers, which reveal that they have not
deteriorated, or een that they have improved,
may hide the fact that they have moved against
producers who sell at harvest time. Interestingly,
there is the possibility of a feedback mechanism
characterised by increasing seasonal fluctuations
if. as economic disparities increase, a larger pro-
portion of the total marketed surplus is sold in
the immediate post-harvest months.
Seasonal fluctuations in the prices of the goods
and services which producers purchase are less
severe than fluctuations in producer prices. The
seasonal fluctuations in Ghana are not sufficient
to counteract producer price fluctuations, and
sometimes they reinforce them. For example, in
the cocoa-growing belt, prices of such corn-
mcdities as sandals, buckets, pans, toys, children's
dresses, khaki cloth, and singlets increase slightly
during the main cocoa harvest, from September
to December, when there is an injection of cash
into the economy, but this is precisely the time
when prices of food staples are low. Seasonal
movements of some commodities are prohibited
as the government lixes control prices, but during
periodic shortages black market prices prevail.
The impact of these price increases on the farmer
is negligible as long as he can defer consumption.
The most signilIcant distributional impact of
seasonal movements in purchased goods and ser-
vices arises when producers have to buy locally-
produced food. Most producers aim to satisfy
the majority of their food consumption require-
ments themselves, but in northern Ghana some
small-scale producers do not harvest enough to
tide them over the lean season and they find
themselves in the individious position of buying
focdstulisít the time of year when prices are
highest, having sometimes (owing to pressing
cash needs) sold the same commodities at the time
of sear when prices were lowest (see Songsore
1975). The seasonal structure of the terms of trade
can thus impose a double penalty on poor pro-
ducers, and if rich producers within the community
are acting as part-time traders buying up farm
produce when it is cheap and selling later when it
is dear, there is a magnified redistributive effect
within rural communities. Polly Hill (1972) has
described this situation precisely in northern
Nigeria.
Spatial structure
Just as the seasonal structure of the terms of trade
imposes a double penalty on some poor pro-
ducers, their spatial structure imposes a double
penalty on all rural communities remote from
tac urban centres which are the source of village
imports and the destination of food exports.
Spatial variations in the terms of trade are par-
ticularly marked in economies where the market-
ing system is technically inefficient and pricing
uncompetitive; where the urban population, and
thus food demand, is concentrated in a few large
cities; where a large proportion of the goods pur
chased by farmers is imported through the
national ports; and where local manufacturing
industries, government services, and wholesaling
activities are concentrated in a few urban centres.
When a single primate city acts as both the major
source of village imports and destination for food
exports, there is likely to be a perfect correlation
between the terms of trade and distance from
that centre (Kelley 1976). The further a producer
lives from that centre, the less he gets for the
farm produce he sells and the more he pays for
the goods and services he buys.
What is the scale of spatial variations in the terms
of trade? Spatial variation in rural prices is an
even more neglected topic than seasonal fluctua-
tions and I shall only present some indirect
evidence from Ghana, relating mainly to producer
prices.
One may presume that producer prices are
determined by the demand and supply situation
in each locality but the upper limit to the price
is set by the cost of transport to the urban centres
where the prodLice is consumed, and the lower
limit is set by the cost of production. Theoreti-
cally, when marketing channels are competitive,
producer prices will be less than wholesale prices
in the urban centres by an amount equivalent
to the transport costs to those centres, and when
marketing channels are monopolistic, prices will
be below this level but above a hypothetical
breakevcn point at which prices are so low that
the farmer feels that it is not worthwhile to pro-
duc for the market beyond his essential cash
needs My indirect evidence will thus consist of
data un the comparative disadvantage of different
farming localities in terms of transport costs to
urban markets and the competitiveness of rural-
urban marketing links.
(ontrar to expectations, rural-urban transport
costs are not very significant in generating differ-
ences in producer prices between communities.
Transport costs from village markets to urban
centres rarely absorb more than 10 per cent of
the final retail price, even for low value, bulky
goods and for long distance hauls, and so the
cost disadvantage of communities near to and
far from the urban centres are not very different.
For example, in February 1975, the cost of
conveying a bag of maize to Koforidua in south-
eastern Ghana (when the prevailing wholesale
price was approximately N24.00) was N0.60
from Okrakwadjo (12 miles from town): N«T00
from Asesewa (30 miles away); Nl.60 from
Ahamahamasu (46 miles); N2.50 from Ejura
(184 miles); and N3.00 from Atebubu (222
miles).
Local transport rates within rural areas are much
higher than rural-urban rates and so the small
difference in distance between a producer living
in a village market centre and another living in
a village five miles into the bush can create a
surprisingly large cost disadvantage. This is
particularly true if farmers have to headload
produce to the initial point of sale. I recorded the
following rates for headloading a bag of maize
to Obuoho (a village market centre near
Koforidua) in 1974-75: l- milesN0.60; 2 milesNl.50; 4 milesN2.40. Furthermore, in
addition to these financial costs, there are the
opportunity costs of the farmers' selling time, an
extremely complex variable to measure but one
which is very important to the producer.
Differences in the competitiveness of rural-urban
marketing channels tend to reinforce the transport
cost disadvantage of remote communities. In
Ghana, most of the major consumption centres
are in the Forest Belt or along the coast and the
main buyers in many Savannah localities are long-
distance wholesalers. Entry into this activity is
constrained by large capital and skill require-
ments and so long distance trading channels tend
to be more monopolistic than local channels.
Communities within the Savannah which are
locally remote (off the main motorable roads) are
at a particular disadvantage, as visiting buyers
tend to concentrate on more accessible localities
until supplies are exhausted. In the Forest Belt in
areas close to the major consumption centres,
producers in locally remote communities (more
than tour miles from a village market centre)
may similarly face an uncompetitive selling situ-
ation as most local traders prefer to buy in village
markets with direct commercial lorry connections
with the urban centres. But whereas the buyers in
this type of locality are a few out of many local
traders, buyers in locally remote localities in the
Savannah are a few out of a small number of
long distance traders.
This is necessarily a brief, and somewhat over-
simplified, sketch, but what I am suggesting is
that those localities with the greatest transport
cost disadvantage are likely to be the same as
those with the greatest trading margin disadvan-
tage, and that, if village communities are arranged
along a continuum according to the level of
producer prices, at one extreme one will find
villages in remote localities within remote districts
whilst at the other extreme will be villages in
accessible localities within accessible districts. My
own field research suggests that in the first type of
locality producers sometimes receive less than
40 per cent of the urban retail price whilst in the
last type they may receive more than 70 per cent.
Turning to spatial variations in the prices of
goods and services which producers purchase, we
enter a terra incognita. In Ghana, the government
control prices ensure that there are only small
regional differences in some commodities some
of the time but, as stated earlier, black market
pricing prevails periodically. I do not wish to
speculate on the size of price differentials between
rural communities but merely to re-emphasize
that spatial variations in the rural cost of living
compound the locational disadvantages of remote
rural communities. Communities which receive
less for their farm produce are likely to pay more
for the goods and services which they purchase.
The distributional consequences of the spatial
structure of the terms of trade are felt between
farming localities. Whether the terms of trade
are moving in favour or against producers in
general, some communities are persistently worse
oft than others and the systematic bias against
particular communities arises through their loca-
tion. This factor is generating 'spatial disparities'
within the rural sector just as the seasonal struc-
turc of the terms of trade is generating social
disparities between individuals within a com-
munity.
However, the social and spatial dimensions are
interdependent. The power of seasonal price
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fluctuations as a mechanism of economic differen-
tiation depends on the importance of commodities
with marked seasonality in the farmers' marketed
surplus. inaccessibility to urban centres constrains
the range of commodities that can be profitably
sold, and if the commodities which are unprofit-
able in remote localities are also those with least
scasonality, the distributional impact of the
seasonal structure of the terms of trade will be
most strongly felt within remote villages.
Furthermore, assuming that there are no seasonal
fluctuations in trading margins and transport
costs, the relative disadvantage of remoteness will
be much greater for poor farmers than for rich
farmers. We may illustrate this point with a
hypothetical (though, in Ghanaian terms, not
totally unrealistic) example. Let us take two
farming localities in which producers sell maize
destined for consumption in the only urban centre
in the country. The price they receive is equivalent
to the urban wholesale price minus transport
costs to each locality. Suppose it costs N1.00
to ship one bag of maize to the urban centre from
one locality; N6.00 from the other. The urban
wholesale price per bag is Nl2.00 at harvest
time and N36.00 jr the month before harvest.
A small-scale producer selling at harvest time
thus receives Nll.00 per bag in the accessible
locality but only N6.00 in the inaccessible one;
a large-scale producer storing and selling just
before harvest time receives N35.00 per bag in
the accessible locality and N3O.00 per bag in
the inaccessible one. Thus whereas the poor
farmer in the remote locality gets approximately
55 per cent of the price received by the poor
farmer in the accessible locality, the rich farmer
in the remote locality gets approximately 86 per
cent of his rich counterpart.
Conclusion
This pàper has been concerned to show how two
hidden dimensions of the barter terms of trade,
their seasonal and spatial structure, can act as
mechanisms of economic differentiation within
the rural sector. The analysis is partial, as varia-
tions in the real income of producers depend on
variations in output as well as on the barter terms
of trade, and so such factors as access to land,
tenure arrangements, loan restrictions, and access
to technical innovations which can increase
productivity are the fundamental determinants of
rural inequality. However, variations in the barter
terms of trade complement these production-side
factors, because the real prices which the farmers
receive determine both the amount of capital
available for productive investment and the
incentive for increasing or decreasing production.
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In poor countries in which there are significant
seasonal fluctuations and spatial variations in
prices, the terms of trade of food producers are
an important link in the complex of causes
perpetuating and intensifying rural inequality.
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